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Abstract 
 
I extend the Higher-Order View of Undermining Defeat (HOVUD) defended in 
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considerations concerning the defeat of externalist epistemic warrants. 
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One of the things that epistemologists worry about is the relation of epistemic 
support, in virtue of which something gives a subject reason to believe that a 
proposition is true. While the notion of epistemic support might be accounted 
for in a variety of ways, for the sake of simplicity in what follows I will assume 
that what gives a subject reason to believe that a proposition p is true is the pos-
session of a piece of evidence that supports p. We can thus say that evidence for 
p is a justifier for p, in that it provides the agent with justification to believe that 
p is true. 
If justifiers—evidence—provide the epistemic agent with justification, de-
featers take justification away from her. Just like justifiers, defeaters have epis-
temic force, but it is a force that speaks against believing a proposition, rather 
than in favour of it. For the purposes of this paper, let us understand defeaters as 
pieces of counterevidence—evidence that speaks against believing a proposition. 
Since Pollock (1974: 42-43), defeaters are commonly distinguished in at 
least two different kinds. Say that p is a previously justified proposition for a 
subject S: overriding defeaters give S a reason to believe not-p; undermining de-
featers, on the other hand, give S merely a reason to give up p, without thereby 
giving a reason to believe not-p. The present article develops a previous contri-
bution to understanding the way in which undermining defeaters work.  
In Melis (2014), I defended a view according to which undermining defeat-
ers require the subject to engage in some higher-order epistemic reasoning, while 
overriding defeaters do not. One limit of that account was that it applied only to 
a doxastic notion of justification and defeat. In this paper I extend the proposal 
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to propositional justification and defeat, and I elaborate the crucial notion of 
higher-order commitments. The plan is the following: first (§ 1) I will present the 
view already defended and (§ 1.1) I will provide some details about the notion of 
higher-order commitment, then (§ 2) I will briefly recall the distinction between 
propositional and doxastic justification and show why the account of undermin-
ing defeat presented does not apply to propositional justification. Finally (§ 3), I 
will extend the account to propositional justification. 
 
1. The Higher-Order View of Undermining Defeat 
Let us begin by considering some examples to illustrate the difference between 
undermining and overriding defeaters. In the propositional triads below, e repre-
sents the evidence that supports p, p the proposition the subject is justified in be-
lieving, and d the defeater.1 
(1) e = <Adam says that Paul McCartney was the drummer of The Beatles> 
 p = <Paul McCartney played in the Beatles> 
 d = <Lauren tells me that Adam’s knowledge in matters of pop music is poor> 
(2) e = <I remember having left the book on the desk> 
p = <The book is on the desk> 
d = <I now see that the book is not on the desk> 
(3) e = <[S’s apparent proof of p]> 
p = <[A seemingly logical theorem]> 
d = <A logician tells S that there is a mistake in the (apparent) proof> 
(4) e = <All swans observed at t1 are white>  
p = <All swans are white> 
d = <At t2 a black swan is observed in Australia> 
The defeater d in cases (2) and (4) explicitly suggests that not-p, while in cases 
(1) and (3) it is compatible with the truth of p. In (2) and (4) the defeaters are 
overriders, in (1) and (3) they are underminers.  
Taking the inspiration from different remarks made by Scott Sturgeon 
(2014) and Albert Casullo (2003: 45-46), I defended the following Higher-Order 
View of Undermining Defeat (HOVUD): 
 
(HOVUD) Underminers suggest that something was wrong with the source of jus-
tification or with the justificatory process, and they operate their defeat by ap-
pealing to the higher-order commitment that the belief in question was based on 
that source or that process. If the suggestion is that the process, rather than the 
source, was defective, the defectiveness is to be understood as the occurrence of a 
mistake or some other disturbing event.2 
 
In order to assess the explanatory power of the view, we need to go back to 
examples (1)-(4). Before doing that, however, I will make a few clarificatory re-
marks about some of the notions I have appealed to in (HOVUD). 
 
1 I do not mean to suggest that all evidence (or counter-evidence) is propositional, but on-
ly that for every piece of evidence, there is a proposition that can be used to represent it. 
2 A refinement of (HOVUD) proposed in fn. 16 of Melis 2014 has it that the suggestion 
made with respect to the source or the process can also be that they might have been defec-
tive. 
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By ‘source of justification’ I mean something of a rather large scale, like the 
agent’s five senses, her memory, her reasoning abilities, or someone’s testimony. 
Justificatory sources provide the evidence for p, and deliver justificatory pro-
cesses. By ‘justificatory process’ I mean the activity that begins with the gather-
ing of the evidence and that ends with the formation of the belief. The stage of 
evidence-gathering often involves interaction with things external to the mental 
life of the subject, but overall, justificatory processes are mental affairs internal 
to the agent.3 
Higher-order commitments are potential or actual cognitive attitudes (e.g. 
beliefs, acceptances, presuppositions) of the agent towards propositions about 
the ways in which beliefs are justifiably formed, retained and abandoned—
propositions that describe and sustain the justification of the agent’s doxastic 
state (the set of the agent’s beliefs) at a time t.4 In general, every epistemically re-
spectable change in the set of the agent’s beliefs involves some higher-order 
commitments.5 The propositions towards which the relevant agent is committed 
are such that she would take them to be true (or just warranted) on reflection—
at least for as long as she stands by the related piece of justification.6 We might 
say that, in a loose sense, the higher-order commitments are part of the agent’s 
justification, in that the agent could resort to them to defend the epistemic wor-
thiness of her belief, if questioned. However, the agent need not be aware that 
the relevant commitments are in place in order to form, retain, and abandon be-
liefs in an epistemically worthy manner.  
Let us consider an example. When I come to believe that it is ten o’clock by 
looking at my watch, I thereby form a justified belief which is sustained by 
commitments towards propositions like ‘the belief that it is ten o’clock was 
formed by looking at my watch’, ‘my watch is reliable’, or ‘I would have not 
trusted my watch if I had a good reason to believe it had stopped working’, and 
so on. However, I do not need to appreciate that such commitments are in place 
(i.e. that I am committed to take those higher-order propositions as true or war-
ranted)7 in order to be justified in believing that it is ten o’clock. Still, if some ex-
igent interlocutor were to push me to lay down my reasons to believe that it is 
ten o’clock, I would, maybe after some reflection, probably bring up some of the 
higher-order commitments. 
We can now go back to (HOVUD), according to which the phenomenon of 
undermining defeat is articulated in two distinct parts. Firstly, the underminer 
needs a certain higher-order commitment about the source of justification or 
about the justificatory process to be in place; secondly, the underminer challeng-
 
3 That is not to say that the subject needs to be aware of the mental activity involved in 
the justificatory process. 
4 In so far as such propositions overtly describe the epistemic activity of the subject—as 
opposed to merely implicitly expressing the subject’s engagement in it—they are higher-
order propositions. 
5 Exactly which ones depends on the details about the source of justification and justifica-
tory processes involved.  
6 More on the rather important notion of relevant agent below in § 1.1. 
7 Details here depend on the specific cognitive attitude. For example, while believing 
would require taking the relevant higher-order propositions as true, accepting and pre-
supposing might require only taking them as just warranted, or at any rate something 
which generally is not truth-guaranteeing. 
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es the epistemic worthiness of that very commitment. Let us consider the exam-
ples. 
The commitment that has to be in place for the undermining defeat to be ef-
fective in example (1) is a commitment about the source of justification, the rel-
evant proposition being: ‘the belief that Paul McCartney played in the Beatles 
was based on Adam’s testimony’. That the commitment has to be in place so 
that d can do its defeating job can be seen by noting that if I had taken my belief 
to have been justified by a different source—maybe someone else’s testimony—
the acquisition of the information that Adam’s knowledge in matters of pop mu-
sic is poor would not have had any defeating effect.8 That the epistemic worthi-
ness of the commitment is challenged by d can easily be seen by considering the 
very content of d, whose general suggestion is that the source of justification is 
not reliable with respect to the subject matter. 
By contrast, nothing of the sort goes on in the overriding defeat involved in 
examples (2) and (4). In both cases, the defeater d could have done its defeating 
work just as well if the relevant agent had taken the beliefs to have been justified 
by any other source rather than memory (case 2), or inductive reasoning (case 
4). Thus, there is no need for a higher-order commitment concerning the source 
of justification or the justificatory process9 to be in place so that the defeat can be 
effective. Such examples suggest that overriding defeat, in general, does not rely 
on the presence of commitments about the way in which the relevant belief was 
formed or justified. 
Case (3) is an example of undermining defeat in which the challenge raised 
by the underminer concerns the justificatory process rather than the justificatory 
source. In the case at hand, the justificatory source is provided by the agent’s 
proving abilities, as it were. Such source delivers the alleged proof that p, whose 
execution on the subject’s part constitutes the relevant justificatory process. The 
commitment that has to be in place and that is challenged in case (3) concerns 
the following proposition: ‘the belief that p was based on the execution of that 
specific proof’. If the subject had taken her proving abilities to have delivered a 
different computation, d would not have had any undermining effect. The epis-
temic worthiness of the commitment is challenged because d suggests that some-
thing went wrong in that justificatory process.10 
The preceding paragraph offers the occasion for an interesting reflection 
about the difference in the way underminers and overriders impinge on higher-
 
8 This example should also help to clarify what it means for an underminer to appeal to 
some higher-order commitments: in general, an underminer d appeals to some higher-
order commitment c when d could not do its defeating job, unless c was in place (that is, 
unless the relevant agent took c to be true or warranted on reflection).  
9 Since justificatory processes are delivered by justificatory sources, if a defeater is effec-
tive regardless of the source of justification, it is to be expected that it is effective also re-
gardless of the specific justificatory process delivered by the source.  
10 One might think that the underminer challenges the epistemic worthiness of the source 
via the challenge raised to the justificatory process. That might happen in some cases, but 
it is easy to conceive of a scenario in which that is not what happens in example (3). Just 
suppose that the subject is generally good at proving theorems, and that she executed the 
calculation in optimal circumstances (she was sober, in a quiet room, etc.). Since the oc-
casional mistake is compatible with the trustworthiness of the source, the challenge raised 
by d in such a construction of case (3) does not extend from the process to the source. See 
Melis (2014: §§ 2-3) for more details. 
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order reasoning. Indeed, there is a sense in which overriders suggest that some-
thing went wrong with the justificatory process too. Overriders suggest that the 
previously justified belief is false, and since a justificatory process that produces 
a false belief cannot be a successful one (believing what is true is one of the main 
epistemic goals), if the overrider is right, something must have gone wrong with 
the justificatory process. Thus, we have to acknowledge that overriders do have 
some implications in the realm of higher-order epistemic reasoning too. Howev-
er, such an acknowledgement does not question the point made in (HOVUD). 
The point made in (HOVUD) is that while the acceptance of an underminer 
(and the belief revision that follows) compels the agent to engage in some high-
er-order epistemic reasoning, the acceptance of an overrider does not. And that 
is compatible with the acceptance of overriders having some implications in the 
higher-order sphere. Let us have another quick look at the examples. The agent 
can accept the overrider in cases (2) and (4), and accordingly update her set of 
beliefs by replacing p with not-p, without considering any thought about the rel-
evant justificatory sources of processes. Of course, if the agent is a very respon-
sible epistemic agent, she might ask herself some questions about the epistemic 
worthiness of the sources or the processes. But she does not have to. On the oth-
er hand, in cases (1) and (3), the agent gives up the belief that p precisely as a re-
sult of the emergence of doubts about the trustworthiness of the justificatory 
sources or processes that have been raised by the relevant underminer.11 
Summing up, (HOVUD) does two things: on one hand it provides an ac-
count of how undermining defeat works; on the other, it explains the difference 
between underminers and overriders in terms of the impact they have on the 
sphere of higher-order reasoning. Contrary to what underminers do, overriders 
do not need to appeal to higher-order commitments about how the belief was 
formed, and do not need to challenge the epistemic worthiness of those com-
mitments. If so, underminers force the subject to reflect about the ways in which 
her beliefs were formed, and thus cut at a deeper epistemic level than overriders 
do: unreflective agents can suffer overriding defeat, but they cannot suffer un-
dermining defeat.12  
 
 
 
 
 
11 In Melis (2014: § 3), I gave more emphasis to another difference between underminers 
and overriders at this junction: while the suggestion made by overriders with respect to 
the faultiness of the justificatory process is compatible with the correct execution of the 
process—it is in the nature of justificatory processes delivered by fallible sources of justi-
fication that sometimes they fail to lead to truth—the suggestion made by the undermin-
ers is not. In other words, while overriders merely suggest that (as sometimes happens) 
the process failed to lead to truth, underminers suggest that a specific disturbing event has 
caused the process to fail. This point, reflected in the last clause mentioned in (HOVUD), 
is not crucial for the aim of extending (HOVUD) to propositional justification, and limits 
of space advice against expanding further on it. 
12 One might think that there might be cases in which defeaters work as both underminers 
and overriders. I do consider the possibility of such cases in Melis (2014: § 5). 
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1.1 More on Higher-Order Commitments13 
Before moving on, I wish to clarify when exactly a higher-order commitment is 
in place. To that end, let us imagine that the agent has some misconceptions 
about the way in which she formed her belief. Say that the agent justifiably be-
lieves a proposition p, and that she explicitly believes (again, justifiably so) that 
she based her belief on source X while in fact she based it on source Y. In such a 
case, we can think of two kinds of higher-order commitments: those concerning 
propositions about the actual source Y—such as “the belief that p was based on 
source Y”, or “source Y is reliable”, etc.—and those concerning propositions 
about the putative source X—such as “the belief that p was based on source X”, 
or “source X is reliable”, etc. Are both kinds of commitments in place? Yes. For 
every justification, actual or merely putative, there are some higher-order com-
mitments in place, and (HOVUD) is a proposal which is meant to account for 
the defeat of whichever justification (either actual or putative) is under scrutiny. 
But let us reflect on the case just described with some care. 
One might raise the following worry. Since the agent described is complete-
ly unaware that she formed her belief in p on the basis of source Y, she would 
not be able to take a higher-order proposition like “source Y is reliable” to be 
true (or warranted) on reflection. How can the commitments about the actual 
source Y be in place then? It is at this juncture that the emphasis on the relevant 
agent becomes important. While in many ordinary circumstances the agent that 
would take the commitments to be in place is the actual agent, in cases where 
the actual agent has some misconceptions on the way she formed her beliefs (or 
simply ignores it without being in the position to figure it out—see next para-
graph and fn. 14), the agent that would take a given commitment to be in place 
varies depending on the commitments (and the related justification) in question. 
If we consider the commitments about the putative way in which the belief was 
justified, then the relevant agent is the actual agent. In the case mentioned, it is 
the actual agent that, on reflection, would take the higher-order proposition “the 
belief that p was based on source X” or “source X is reliable” to be true or war-
ranted. However, if we consider the commitments about the actual way in which 
the belief was justified, then the relevant agent is the idealized agent who is like 
the actual agent in all respects, except that she has no misconceptions about the 
way in which the belief was formed. Of course, in the case described the actual 
agent might not be able to appreciate the defeat of what I have referred to as ‘ac-
tual justification’, but that does not mean that that justification is not defeated—
in an externalist sense. And (HOVUD) has the tools to account for that defeat. 
The relation between (HOVUD) and the defeat of externalist justification 
can be seen clearly by considering the following similar worry. Suppose that the 
subject S is (non-culpably) unaware of the fact that she has formed her belief in p 
on the basis of source X, and that the defeater, although it does nothing to show 
that X is the source of S’s belief, challenges the epistemic worthiness of X. Does 
not (HOVUD) in this case predict defeat when intuitively none occurs? It is true 
that (HOVUD) predicts that, in the case described, there is undermining defeat. I 
stand by that. I also acknowledge that there is an intuitive sense in which there 
is no defeat, but the intuitions at play here involve an internalist conception of 
 
13 Thanks to two anonymous referees for alerting me to the issues discussed in this sec-
tion. 
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epistemic justification, according to which a subject can only be justified if she is 
aware of the relevant justifying factors, as it were. In the case at hand, on an in-
ternalist conception of justification, S is not justified in believing that p on the ba-
sis of source X because S is not aware that she based her belief on source X. And, 
the objection goes, if there is no justification, there is no defeat. I have no quib-
bles with that. However, what the objection fails to mention is that, in an exter-
nalist sense—which does not require the subject to be aware of the relevant justi-
fying factors—S is justified in believing that p on the basis of source X (assuming 
the conditions on the source posed by the relevant externalist account of justifi-
cation are met). And such externalist justification is precisely the one that 
(HOVUD) predicts gets defeated.14 
The lesson that we should draw from the cases illustrated in this section is 
that (HOVUD) is neutral with respect to at least some of the dimensions along 
which epistemic justification can vary. (HOVUD) is a theory of undermining de-
feat that explains how undermining defeat works in either internalist or external-
ist cases, and regardless of whether the justification in question is actual or puta-
tive. Let us now turn to the extension of (HOVUD) to propositional justification.  
 
2. The Limit to Doxastic Justification  
Before we see why (HOVUD) is limited to doxastic justification, and why that 
should be a reason of concern, let us recall the difference between propositional 
and doxastic justification. 
It is common to account for the distinction between propositional and dox-
astic justification along the following lines: when a subject has a reason or evi-
dence to believe that p, she has propositional justification to believe that p; when 
a subject has a reason or evidence to believe that p, and bases her belief that p on 
those reasons or that evidence, she is doxastically justified in believing that p.15 If 
a subject is doxastically justified in believing a proposition, she also has proposi-
tional justification to believe that proposition, but not vice versa: in other words, 
doxastic justification entails propositional justification, but not vice versa. 
Here is a quick example: an agent that justifiedly believes that Cagliari is in 
Sardinia, and that Sardinia is in Italy, has propositional justification to believe 
that Cagliari is in Italy, but it is when the agent (competently) draws the relevant 
inference that she is (doxastically) justified in believing that Cagliari is in Sardin-
ia. 
To see why (HOVUD) is limited to doxastic justification, we need to under-
stand that while doxastic justification requires that the proposition justified is be-
lieved by the agent, propositional justification does not. Recall that according to 
(HOVUD), underminers work by appealing to some higher-order commitments 
about the way in which the relevant belief was originally formed. But proposi-
tional justification does not require belief formation, and thus does not require 
 
14 To put the point in terms of the relevant agent, we might say that the higher-order 
commitments involved concern propositions that an idealized agent—alike the actual agent 
in all respects, except that she does not ignore how the belief was formed—would take to 
be true or warranted.  
15 See Feldman (2002: 46) and Pollock and Cruz (1999: 35-36) for just two examples of 
this way of drawing the distinction.  
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any commitments about belief-formation. So, (HOVUD) does not apply to prop-
ositional justification. 
To see why the advocate of (HOVUD) should be concerned by this limita-
tion, consider the following variation of example (1). Suppose that Adam tells 
me many things and that, before I have a chance to consider them and update 
my set of beliefs, Lauren tells me that Adam is a compulsive liar. In such a case, 
I obtain an underminer for the justification I get from Adam’s testimony, before 
I have a chance to form the beliefs whose higher-order commitments (HOVUD) 
predicts that the underminer calls into question. Thus, (HOVUD) cannot ac-
count for such a case. And the reason is that the underminer in question affects 
the propositional justification to believe propositions before the agent actually 
forms any belief on the basis of that justification.  
The lesson seems to be that the phenomenon of defeat arises with respect to 
propositional justification. If so, any account that, like (HOVUD), is tied to dox-
astic justification does not generalize far enough.16 
 
3. Extending (HOVUD) to Propositional Justification 
In this section I will argue that (HOVUD) can be extended to propositional justi-
fication in virtue of the close relationship that exists between propositional and 
doxastic justification. In a nutshell, propositional justification involves higher-
order commitments analogous to those involved in doxastic justification, and 
those commitments are what underminers call into question in the defeat of 
propositional justification.  
But let us begin with the relationship between propositional and doxastic 
justification. We said that a subject that bases her belief in p on some evidence e 
is doxastically justified in believing p. However, the justificatory process that 
brings the subject to believe p on the basis of e is grounded in a relation between 
e and p that is in place regardless of whether the subject uses it to her avail. That 
relation of support between e and p is propositional justification. In this sense, 
doxastic justification arises from propositional justification. 
Let me briefly expand on this. Consider the set of the propositions that con-
stitute the subject’s evidence. Those propositions epistemically support a num-
ber of other propositions, to which they are related in propositional justification. 
The use of that epistemic link to form a justified belief (doxastic justification) is 
available to the subject since the moment in which she acquires the evidence, 
but it might take a while before she follows that link to form an actual belief, if 
ever. Justificatory processes proceed along that pre-existing epistemic link and 
lead the subject to doxastic justification. What matters for our purposes is that 
the relations of (propositional) justification between the propositions in the set of 
the evidence and those in the set of what is supported by the evidence involve 
higher-order commitments. Of course, they are not commitments about actual 
belief-formation, but rather commitments about the ways in which e supports 
p.17 Those are the commitments that are challenged by undermining defeaters. 
Let us consider the problematic case for (HOVUD) mentioned in the previ-
ous section. The (propositional) justification to believe the various propositions 
 
16 Thanks to Declan Smithies for bringing this issue to my attention in correspondence. 
17 They concern the source of justification, the acquisition of the evidence e provided by 
the source, and the relation of support between e and p.  
Undermining Defeat and Propositional Justification 279 
that Adam is testifying involves the commitment towards the proposition that 
the source of justification is Adam’s testimony. Such commitment does not con-
cern belief-formation, but only the support relation that exists between the prop-
ositions that work as justifiers (propositions of the form ‘Adam says that p’) and 
the propositions justified (the various corresponding p’s). For the acquisition of 
the information that Adam is a compulsive liar to undermine the (propositional) 
justification to believe what Adam says, that commitment has got to be in place: 
should the relevant agent take the propositional justifications in question to be 
due to Peter’s testimony rather than Adam’s, the information that Adam is not 
to be trusted would not have any undermining effect. Moreover, it is the epis-
temic worthiness of that very commitment that is called into question by the un-
dermining defeater, which suggests that Adam is not a reliable source. This is all 
very much in the spirit of (HOVUD). 
Here is a formulation of a version of (HOVUD) that applies to propositional 
justification. 
 
(HOVUD-prop) Underminers suggest that something was wrong with the source 
of justification or with the grounds that support p, and they operate their defeat 
by appealing to the higher-order commitment that p is supported by that source 
or those grounds. If the suggestion is that something was wrong with the 
grounds, rather than with the source, the defectiveness is to be understood as the 
occurrence of a mistake or some other disturbing event that spoiled the epistemic 
worthiness of the grounds. 
 
Of course, the main difference between (HOVUD) and (HOVUD-prop) is 
that the former talks about commitments concerning the formation of a justified 
belief, and the latter talks about commitments concerning the formation of a jus-
tification which need not result in belief formation. Just like in the case of doxas-
tic justification, the commitments involved in propositional justification concern 
propositions that the relevant agent would take to be true on reflection (as long 
as she sticks to the corresponding justification). However, the agent that would 
take the higher-order propositions to be true or warranted on reflection is, once 
again, an idealized one: it is the idealized agent that, on the basis of the same 
body of evidence available to the actual agent, goes on to form all the beliefs 
that are supported by that body of evidence (including those that, for whatever 
reason, the actual agent fails to form). 
A second difference worth noticing is that the notion of justificatory process 
included in (HOVUD) has been substituted with that of grounds in (HOVUD-
prop). The reason is that justificatory processes are largely mental and have to do 
with belief-formation, and thus cannot play a role in (HOVUD-prop). However, 
propositional justification offers something that underlies the justificatory pro-
cess involved in doxastic justification, and I have called that ‘the grounds for p’. 
I understand grounds as a non-mental analogue of justificatory processes: the 
pre-existing epistemic path that goes from the subject’s acquisition of e to the 
conferral of the positive epistemic status to p. Such a notion of grounds can thus 
refer both to the acquisition of the evidence (from which the epistemic path be-
gins) and to the relation between the evidence and the proposition supported p 
(which constitute the remaining of the epistemic path). Just like justificatory 
processes, justificatory grounds have their origin in a source of justification.  
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Let us now briefly consider the previous examples of undermining defeat 
and suppose that the justification in question is propositional rather than doxas-
tic. (HOVUD-prop) works in a way just parallel to (HOVUD). In (1) the under-
miner suggests that the source was not reliable with respect to the subject matter, 
and the higher-order commitment under attack is that the (propositional) justifi-
cation to believe that Paul McCartney played in the Beatles has its source in 
Adam’s testimony. In example (3) the underminer suggests that something was 
wrong with the grounds, and the commitment under attack is that the (proposi-
tional) justification to believe p is given by that alleged proof (as opposed to the 
agent’s execution of that alleged proof, which constitutes the justificatory process). 
 
4. Conclusion 
To conclude, I acknowledge that, in an important sense, the phenomenon of de-
feat arises at the propositional level. Since the phenomenon of defeat concerns 
justification, and, at least in the way explained above, propositional justification 
comes before doxastic justification, it is no surprise that the phenomenon of de-
feat concerns primarily propositional justification. Yet, as I hope to have shown, 
(HOVUD) can easily be extended to account for the defeat of propositional justi-
fication. More generally, (HOVUD) promises to have the tools to account for 
undermining defeat regardless of several of the dimensions along which justifi-
cation can vary: propositional vs. doxastic, actual vs. putative, externalist vs. in-
ternalist.18 
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